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Abstract
Background: Venezuela is one of the most violent countries in the world. According to
the United Nations, homicide rates in the country increased from 32.9 to 61.9 per 100 000
people between 2000 and 2014. This upsurge coincided with a slowdown in life expec-
tancy improvements. We estimate mortality trends and quantify the impact of violence-
related deaths and other causes of death on life expectancy and lifespan inequality in
Venezuela.
Methods: Life tables were computed with corrected age-specific mortality rates from
1996 to 2013. From these, changes in life expectancy and lifespan inequality were
decomposed by age and cause of death using a continuous-change model. Lifespan in-
equality, or variation in age at death, is measured by the standard deviation of the age-
at-death distribution.
Results: From 1996 to 2013 in Venezuela, female life expectancy rose 3.57 [95% confi-
dence interval (CI): 3.08–4.09] years [from 75.79 (75.98–76.10) to 79.36 (78.97–79.68)], and
lifespan inequality fell 1.03 (–2.96 to 1.26) years [from 18.44 (18.01–19.00) to 17.41 (17.30–
18.27)]. Male life expectancy increased 1.64 (1.09–2.25) years [from 69.36 (68.89–59.70) to
71.00 (70.53–71.39)], but lifespan inequality increased 0.95 (–0.80 to 2.89) years [from
20.70 (20.24–21.08) to 21.65 (21.34–22.12)]. If violence-related death rates had not risen
over this period, male life expectancy would have increased an additional 1.55 years, and
lifespan inequality would have declined slightly (–0.31 years).
Conclusions: As increases in violence-related deaths among young men (ages 15–39)
have slowed gains in male life expectancy and increased lifespan inequality, Venezuelan
males face more uncertainty about their age at death. There is an urgent need for more
accurate mortality estimates in Venezuela.
Key words: Causes of death, decomposition analysis, homicides, young male mortality, firearm-related deaths,
cardiovascular revolution
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Introduction
Most Latin American countries experienced sizable
improvements in health, living standards and longevity in
the second half of the 20th century.1 In Venezuela, mortal-
ity declined progressively from 1930 onward,2 with life ex-
pectancy increasing from 54.9 years in 1950 to 74.2 years
in 2013.3,4 These advances were driven first by a reduction
in infant mortality;5 then by the postponement of death in
adults; and, finally, by improvements in old-age mortality.6
However, gains in life expectancy have slowed for both
sexes since the mid-1990s. While life expectancy increased
by 3.8 years per decade between 1950 and 1990, gains
since 1990 have fallen to 1.8 years every 10 years.3
This slowdown coincides with a continuous rise in lev-
els of violence in Venezuela. At the beginning of the 1990s,
an ‘epidemic’ of violence had already been identified.7,8
Homicides increased steadily and more than doubled be-
tween 1995 and 2009 (from 20.3 to 49.0 homicides per
100 000 inhabitants).9 By 2010, around 13% of all deaths
were due to violence and injuries,10 and the country had
the fourth-highest crude mortality rate from external
causes in the world.11
Life expectancy is the most widely used indicator of pop-
ulation health, and it reflects the overall level of longevity of
a population. In this study, we assess the contribution of vi-
olence to the recent slowdown in life expectancy gains in
Venezuela. We also quantify the effect of violent deaths in
an equally important dimension of health: the dispersion of
ages at death, or lifespan inequality.12 Lifespan inequality is
an indicator of how similar ages at death are, and has be-
come an important public health topic alongside health
inequalities.13 It is interpreted as a marker of heterogeneity
in ages at death at the macro level14 and of survival uncer-
tainty at the individual level.15,16 Since lifespan inequality is
highly sensitive to premature mortality15 and homicides are
concentrated at working ages, the net effect of the upsurge
of violence is unknown. Studying life expectancy alongside
lifespan inequality in this context may give policymakers a
better understanding of the effects of violence on population
health. The combination of the two indicators suggests that
individuals’ decisions are based not only on their expected
lifespan, but on their uncertainty about when they will
die.12
Over the last decade, public institutions in Venezuela
have been forced to follow a strict policy of secrecy. Since
2013, data sources have not been updated nor made pub-
licly available.17 The government’s constant denials that
mortality is increasing, and particularly mortality due to
external causes, has made it difficult to assess recent
trends. The withholding of official homicide counts started
well before 2013. The last official annual homicide data
were made publicly available a decade earlier.18 Official
data on homicides are traditionally generated by law en-
forcement authorities’ determination of the intent in each
case. However, in the absence of law enforcement data, it
is possible to use the statistical information produced by
health authorities certifying the cause of death of individu-
als.9 To compensate for this lack of data, we corrected the
death counts published by the Ministry of Health for the
period 1996–2013.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, homicide mortality in
Venezuela has been concentrated between ages 15 and 50,
and has mainly affected males (10 times more males than
females).19 We therefore hypothesize that deaths from hom-
icides have contributed to the slowing of improvements in
male life expectancy. As life expectancy and lifespan in-
equality are negatively correlated,15 we expect to observe a
similar adverse effect on lifespan inequality reductions. We
focused on the period after 1996 to test our hypotheses.
During this period, life expectancy trends in Venezuela were
affected not only by the upsurge in violence, but by large
declines in deaths from circulatory diseases20 and the emerg-
ing importance of cancer and diabetes.4
Data
We examined death counts from official mortality year-
books reported by the Venezuelan Ministry of Health from
Key Messages
• The recent upsurge in violence has slowed male life expectancy gains related to reductions in mortality from other
causes (e.g. circulatory, infectious and respiratory diseases).
• Increasing lifespan inequality due to violence-related mortality corresponds to greater uncertainty among Venezuelan
males about their age at death.
• Counteracting the eroding effect of violence, decreases in cardiovascular mortality and under-five mortality are the
main drivers of increasing life expectancy in both sexes.
• Venezuela could improve its overall longevity and lower its lifespan inequality by reducing violent deaths.
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1996 to 2013.21 We used annual population estimates
from the Venezuelan National Institute of Statistics22 as
the denominator to compute age-specific death rates. For
data availability and assessment, see Supplementary
Material: 1. Data sources in Venezuela, pp. 2–5, available
as Supplementary data at IJE online.
Causes of death were classified according to the 10th re-
vision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-
10) and grouped into: (i) circulatory diseases (e.g. heart
diseases, hypertension, ischaemic heart diseases and
cerebrovascular diseases); (ii) neoplasms; (iii) diabetes;
(iv) homicides and other violent deaths (e.g. homicides,
undetermined intent and legal intervention); (v) other ex-
ternal causes (e.g. traffic accidents, injuries and suicide);
(vi) respiratory diseases; (vii) infectious diseases; (viii) di-
gestive diseases; (ix) conditions originating in the perinatal
period; and (x) remaining causes. For a detailed descrip-
tion, see Supplementary Material: 4. Cause of death classi-
fication Table 3, p. 15, available as Supplementary data at
IJE online. To improve the accuracy of our estimates of vi-
olent deaths, we defined them as cases in which the death
certificate stated that the cause of death was ‘homicide’ or
a violent death of undetermined intent; see details in
Supplementary Material: 1.2 Mortality data, p. 2, avail-
able as Supplementary data at IJE online.
To ensure data quality, mortality estimations were ad-
justed for under-reporting, age misreporting and ill-
defined causes of death.23,24 Adjustment for the impact of
under-reporting on mortality rates was undertaken by ap-
plying indirect estimation methods on data from the
1990, 2001 and 2011 population censuses. Specifically,
the synthetic extinct generation and the General Growth
Balance methods were combined25 to estimate adult mor-
tality (Supplementary Material section 2.1.1 Adult mor-
tality Coverage, pp. 7–9, available as Supplementary data
at IJE online), and the Trussell variant of the Brass
method26 was used to estimate infant mortality
(Supplementary Material section 2.1.2 Infant mortality
coverage, p. 9, available as Supplementary data at IJE on-
line). A set of under-registration ratios was obtained by
contrasting intercensal indirect estimation and directly es-
timated mortality rates. These under-registration ratios
were linearly interpolated and extrapolated into the time
frame of our analysis. We assumed that the rate of under-
registration did not fluctuate greatly, but declined
smoothly at a constant pace.
All data assessments and quality adjustments are de-
tailed in the Supplementary Material: 2. Quality of con-
tent, pp. 9–12, available as Supplementary data at IJE
online. Additionally, a robustness check of our life expec-
tancy estimates and violence-related death rate was carried
out using international sources in Supplementary Material:
3. Comparing with life expectancy estimations, p. 14,
available as Supplementary data at IJE online.
Analytical methods
Annual period life tables were constructed using standard
demographic methods.27 From these, life expectancy and
lifespan inequality were calculated with 95% empirical
confidence intervals from bootstrapping with exponential
distribution with piecewise constant rate.28 The latter was
measured by the standard deviation of the age-at-death dis-
tribution (r).29 Changes in both indicators during the study
period were decomposed based on a continuous change
model.30 An advantage of this method is that it assumes
that covariates change gradually (Supplementary Material
7. Description of the decomposition method, p.19, avail-
able as Supplementary data at IJE online). Through de-
composition, we dissected contributions (in years) to
changes in life expectancy and lifespan inequality by each
cause of death at each age.31 For further details, see
Supplementary Material: 6. Brief description of the life-
span variation indicator, pp. 15–16, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online.
Although several lifespan inequality indicators exist
(e.g. Gini coefficient, life years lost, variance), the high de-
gree of correlation between them suggests that our main
results would be consistent with those obtained by another
indicator.29 In addition, by using the standard deviation,
we ensure the comparability of lifespan inequality with life
expectancy because both are expressed in years. These
indicators were chosen because they are easy to under-
stand, interpret and decompose, and thus allow us to quan-
tify changes in age- and cause-specific mortality over time.
Results
Between 1996 and 2013, male life expectancy increased
1.64 [95% confidence intervals (CI): 1.09–2.25] years [from
69.36 (68.89–69.70) to 71 (70.53–71.39) years)], while fe-
male life expectancy increased twice as much [from 75.79
(75.38–76.10) to 79.36 (78.97–79.68) years], gaining 3.57
(3.08–4.09) years. Differences in mortality reductions led to
an increase in the sex differential in life expectancy from
7.19 years in 1996 to 8.76 years in 2013, see Figure 1.
The largest gains in life expectancy for both females and
males occurred at ages below 1 year and above 55 years.
Infant mortality accounted for 13% (þ0.44 years) and
33% (þ0.55 years) of gains in life expectancy for females
and males, respectively. The gains were mostly due to
reductions in deaths from conditions originating during the
perinatal period, and from respiratory and infectious dis-
eases. At older ages, decreasing mortality from circulatory
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Figure 1. Top (Male) and bottom (Female) shows the age- and cause-specific contributions to changes in life expectancy between 1996 and 2013.
Positive (i.e. life expectancy increases) and negative (i.e. life expectancy losses) contributions by cause of death are indicated by the bars.
Additionally, the overall contributions by age group are shown in the boxes at the bottom, and the total contributions by cause of death are indicated
in parentheses in the legend.
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diseases led to life expectancy gains of 1.83 years for
females and 1.34 years for males. However, these gains
were offset by increasing mortality from diabetes and vio-
lence. Diabetes mortality, which mostly affected the popu-
lation over age 50, was associated with decreases in male
and female life expectancy of 0.23 and 0.14 years, respec-
tively. Meanwhile, homicide was the cause of death that
had the largest negative impact on male life expectancy
(–1.55 years), whereas the impact of this cause on female
life expectancy was negligible (–0.07 years). Life expec-
tancy losses due to homicide were concentrated in men be-
tween the ages of 15 and 50.
Between 1996 and 2013, lifespan inequality decreased
1.03 (–2.96 to 1.26) years [from 18.44 (18.01–19.00) to
17.41 (17.30–18.27) years] for females, but increased 0.95
(–0.81 to 2.89) years [from 20.7 (20.24–21.09) to 21.65
(21.34–22.12)] for males, see Figure 2.
Discussion
Between 1996 and 2013, the impact of violent deaths on
male life expectancy in Venezuela was substantial
(–1.95 years). The increase in homicides offset improve-
ments in mortality from other causes such as cardiovascular
diseases, and led to an unprecedented increase in lifespan in-
equality (0.95 years). Recent homicide trends suggest that
conditions will not improve, and may even deteriorate.
When studying Latin American mortality, the first chal-
lenge is undoubtedly insufficient data quality and cover-
age. During the 20th century, Venezuela’s vital statistics
system was more robust than those of most Latin
American countries.32 Coverage improvements in mortal-
ity registry data continued during the first decade of the
21st century.33,34 However, the government’s recent policy
of strict secrecy has made it difficult to access data, and
thus to assess mortality trends. Here, we contribute to the
existing literature on Latin American mortality by over-
coming those limitations and producing robust estimations
of life expectancy, lifespan inequality and violence-related
deaths by using established powerful methodologies to ad-
just for under-registration during the period of our
analysis.
Additionally, in the interests of accuracy, we identified
violent deaths by grouping death counts in which the un-
derlying causes of death could include not just ‘assault’,
but also an ‘event of undetermined intent’ or ‘legal inter-
vention and operations of war’. We used this approach be-
cause homicides are not usually counted as such in the
mortality yearbooks if the intent was not legally deter-
mined before the death certificate was produced. The legal
determination of intent depends on the findings of the po-
lice investigation, and not on the actual occurrence of the
violent act. Our strategy therefore enabled us to estimate
death counts that correspond more closely with official
data on annual homicides (released up to the year 2003)
and unofficial figures reported by national non-
governmental organizations (Supplementary Material: 1.1
Mortality data, pp. 2–3, available as Supplementary data
at IJE online).
Our findings show that improvements in both life ex-
pectancy and lifespan inequality were mostly driven by
reductions in under-five mortality. Decreases in deaths
from cardiovascular diseases also contributed greatly to in-
creasing life expectancy. These results are in line with the
trends we would expect to observe during the second cycle
of the health transition.35 The main development that ran
counter to such positive changes was the upsurge of vio-
lence, which had such a large detrimental impact on
Venezuelan males that all of their gains in life expectancy
from reductions in deaths from other causes were eroded.
As a result of this trend, improvements in life expectancy
have slowed, and as we show, lifespan inequality has even
increased. Males in Venezuela are not just dying earlier on
average; they are facing greater uncertainty about their
eventual time of death due to the threat of premature
mortality by violence. Globally, there are very few
national-level examples of periods in which life expectancy
stagnated or decreased while lifespan inequality increased.
During a period of life expectancy stagnation that occurred
in the 1960s and 1970s in the former Soviet Union, over
half of the time the yearly changes in life expectancy and
lifespan inequality occurred in the same direction due to
mortality deterioration at young ages.36 Thus, ours is the
first study to document an effect of high homicide rates on
increasing lifespan inequality in tandem with stagnation in
life expectancy at the national level. In the United States,
life expectancy has stagnated, but lifespan variation has in-
creased among males as the opioid epidemic has spread.13
This excess young male mortality is a recent phenome-
non. Throughout the 1980s, the homicide rate in
Venezuela was relatively low; i.e. it was close to the levels
observed in countries like Costa Rica, at around eight per
100 000 inhabitants.37 However, the social and economic
upheavals of that decade led to changes in the prevalence
of violence in Venezuela.38 Prior to that period, violence in
Venezuela was largely related to political conflict, and was
rarely the subject of explicit attention. Thereafter, violence
became associated with the urban agglomerations and
‘slums’ that sprang up as the country experienced rapid ur-
banization and high levels of rural–urban migration. This
shift in prevalence reflects the increase in social inequality
and the fragile legitimacy of the state, together with a gen-
uine ‘culture of violence’37 that has intensified in most
Latin American countries.
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Figure 2. Top (Male) and bottom (Female) shows the age- and cause-specific contributions to changes in lifespan inequality. Major improvements in
under-five mortality (mainly due to fewer deaths from perinatal conditions) and in mortality from infectious and respiratory diseases together led to
decreases in lifespan inequality of 1.20 years in males and of 1.34 years in females. However, these improvements were offset by the surge in male
homicide mortality at young ages (15–45). Homicides and other violent causes led to an increase in male lifespan inequality of 1.26 years. Lifespan in-
equality also increased due to improvements in cardiovascular mortality at ages 60 and older (blue bars).
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Three major violent events preceding our time frame
have been identified as tipping points: the popular uprising
against price increases known as ‘El Caracazo’ (1989) and
two attempted coups (1992 and 1993).19,39 These events
led to a doubling of the homicide rate, and since then vio-
lence has not been contained. To put these trends in per-
spective, the homicide rates in Venezuela in 2012 (53.7 per
100 000 inhabitants) were higher than those of Latin
American countries that have experienced undeclared civil
wars in recent decades,7 such as El Salvador (41.2),
Guatemala (39.9) and Colombia (30.8). In 2010, the vio-
lent death rate was higher in Caracas (80.6) than it was in
war-torn Iraq (54.6).11 Legally declared homicides, ‘extra-
judicial executions’ by criminal organizations, police bru-
tality and violent deaths of undetermined intent were the
most common causes of these violent deaths.40 Similar
results have been reported for Mexico, where life expec-
tancy stagnated and lifespan inequality increased in some
regions, due to increases in homicide mortality related to
the war on drugs.41–43
The uniqueness of the Venezuelan experience could be
linked to the combination of two circumstances: rapidly
rising wealth and surging homicide rates. Unprecedented
increases in national income per capita, which enabled the
wider distribution of wealth at the individual level, oc-
curred at the same time as homicide rates were rising
sharply.44 Most studies have viewed income inequality as a
social determinant of ill health and violence,45,46 and the
evidence suggests that in most countries inequality is asso-
ciated with higher rates of homicides and other crimes.47,48
The Venezuelan case challenges assumptions about this re-
lationship. Since the early 2000s in Venezuela, indicators
of poverty and inequality have decreased Supplementary
Material: 8. Wealth and inequality in Venezuela, p. 19,
available as Supplementary data at IJE online, whereas
rates of kidnapping and of other crimes have increased
Supplementary Material: 9. Crime in Venezuela, p. 20,
available as Supplementary data at IJE online. This para-
dox may be attributable to the combined effects of extraor-
dinarily large oil revenues and the failure of the state to
guarantee the security of its citizens.49
Our results underscore the impact of violence on lon-
gevity and on lifespan inequality in Venezuela. The country
could increase its overall longevity and decrease its lifespan
inequality simply by focusing on a clear public health tar-
get of reducing homicides. To reverse the detrimental
effects of violence, new public health interventions are
needed. To reduce homicides, policies that disarm the civil
population and effectively control the legal use of arms
should be implemented. Most of the homicides reported in
this analysis were committed with firearms, which are
widely available in the country. The share of firearm-
related deaths in Venezuela more than tripled between
1996 and 2013, from 1.8% to 6%. Furthermore, between
2003 and 2007, Venezuela was second among South
American countries and 17th in the world in terms of mili-
tary spending increases.50,51 In a context of institutional
weakness, the supply of weapons in Venezuela has flooded
a black market in which local police and armies have be-
come the main weapons smugglers.52
At an official level, the Venezuelan government has
implemented various policies aimed at stopping violence
and criminal activities, including legal and structural
reforms of all existing local police forces (2006), the estab-
lishment of a unique national police force (2009), and the
creation of a presidential commission to control firearms
and weapons (2011).53 As our results show, these efforts
have been insufficient, not only because of the structural
weaknesses of Venezuelan public institutions44 and their
high levels of corruption, but because of the inconsistent (if
not contradictory) attitude of the government regarding the
use of violence.54 When we compare the situation of
Venezuela with that of other countries in the region during
our period of analysis, we see that Colombia and Venezuela
not only experienced opposite trends, but almost swapped
their homicide rates. From 2000 to 2012, Colombia man-
aged to decrease its incidence of violence from a higher
starting point (66.5 to 30.8 per 100 000 inhabitants) than
that of Venezuela (32.9 to 53.7 per 100 000 inhabitants).9
These inverse outcomes are products of different institu-
tional approaches to social control.44 While Venezuela’s
institutions were experiencing a process of systematic anni-
hilation, Colombia strengthened the credibility of its institu-
tional mechanisms of access to justice.55
The future of Venezuela does not seem promising.
Outbreaks of political violence have intensified in recent
years, and the steady militarization of the police could lead to
further increases in the prevalence of violence. Unfortunately,
the additional effects of acute forms of political and socio-
economic disintegration on mortality trends cannot be
updated at this point in time. However, our findings suggest
that male life expectancy trends are likely to shift from stagna-
tion to decline, and that as a result, life expectancy and life-
span inequality will be negatively correlated.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at IJE online.
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